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Reduced returns and longevity risk are making it challenging for employers to offer defined benefit 
pensions. In countries with large defined benefit pension plan sectors, sponsors are transferring 
these obligations, and the associated investment and longevity risk, to life (re)insurers via buy-
outs, buy-ins, and longevity swaps. Nevertheless, to date, there has been no successful longevity 
bond issuance, although there have been several false starts. This contrasts with the active market 
for catastrophe bonds that transfer risk associated with catastrophic events from (re)insurers to 
capital markets. This paper reviews catastrophe bond and other insurance risk transfer market 
developments, to identify the factors and design features that have resulted in success and failure. 
Conclusions are informed by an extensive literature review and quantitative survey, plus 
discussions with market participants including public policy makers. We conclude with 
suggestions for product design features and public policies that might kick start vibrant longevity 
bond markets. 
 














New Financial Instruments for Managing Longevity Risk 
 
Lower expected rates of market returns and rising longevity risk make it challenging for 
employers to offer defined benefit (DB) pensions. In countries with large DB pension sectors (e.g., 
the United Kingdom and the United States), pension plan sponsors are increasingly transferring 
these obligations and the associated investment and longevity risk to life insurers (Figure 1). For 
life insurers, the longevity risk may provide a partial hedge for the mortality risk in their life 
insurance books. The geography of pension risk markets reflects the preponderance of private-
sector defined benefit plans in those countries (Figure 2). 
Figures 1 and 2 here 
Ultimately these markets are driven by the private sector ‘supply’ of longevity risk. So, for 
example, we are not likely to see many of these transactions coming out of countries such as 
France, where the private sector role in pension provision is minimal. The UK, on the other hand, 
has all the ingredients for a healthy demand for pension scheme longevity de-risking, as does the 
Netherlands. In both countries, there are still a great many DB pension schemes, and accounting 
rules and prudential regulations compel scheme sponsors to accurately measure and report their 
pension obligations. Also, the actuarial communities are actively seeking to disseminate more 
frequent and up-to-date longevity data and forward-looking models. 
In what follows, we first explain the market for longevity risk by explaining the key 
transaction types: buy-outs, buy-ins, longevity swaps, and longevity bonds. We also explore some 
of the potential reasons why so little of this risk has made its way to capital markets for transferral. 
Second, we examine catastrophe (CAT) risk markets, which have been quite successful at 
transferring insurance risks to capital markets. The third section explores the potential lessons from 




Pension and Longevity Risk Transfer Markets 
DB pension risks are transferred to insurers via buy-outs, buy-ins, and longevity swaps 
(IMF 2012; Joint Forum 2013). Buy-outs transfer all of a pension fund’s liabilities in return for an 
up-front premium, which in some cases is paid using an ‘in-kind’ transfer of the pension fund’s 
assets (Daniel 2016). In a buy-in, the sponsor retains the pension plan’s assets and liabilities, and 
it receives periodic payments equal to those made to its members from an insurer in return for an 
up-front premium (Figure 3). Underfunded DB plans may prefer buy-ins to buy-outs, because buy-
ins do not require that the funding gap be recognized as an accounting loss. 
Figure 3 here 
Longevity swaps transfer only longevity risk, and the premium is spread over the life of 
the contract based on the difference between the actual and expected benefit payments (Figure 4). 
This approach is typically combined with a liability-driven investing (LDI) asset allocation 
approach that matches the expected cash flow profile to that of the pension benefit payments, plus 
an inflation swap if the plan offers indexed benefits. Underfunded plans often implement LDI 
gradually to defer the cost of closing the funding gap (Citi 2016). Longevity swap counterparties 
are typically required to post collateral depending on whether the market value of the swap is 
positive or negative. Collateral plays a similar role in mitigating counterparty risk as the regulatory 
or solvency capital that (re)insurers are required to hold. Analysis of Biffis et al. (2016) found that 
the overall cost of such collateralization is comparable with that of interest rate swaps, but it does 
require that counterparties have on hand sufficient quantities of the required assets, usually liquid 
high-quality fixed-income securities, to meet collateral calls. The COVID-19 pandemic raised the 
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possibility that, although a pandemic might push down the value of liabilities to DB plan members, 
the short-term rise in mortality could trigger collateral calls (O'Farrell 2020). 
Figure 4 here 
Who uses which technique depends greatly on the type of counterparty. Insurers and 
reinsurers are associated with pension buy-ins and buy-outs, whereas longevity swap transactions 
are associated with investment banks and reinsurers. In most jurisdictions, banks are not allowed 
to issue or take on longevity risk in the form of annuities, buy-ins, or buy-outs, but they can take 
it indirectly via swap transactions (Figure 5). 
Figure 5 here 
The largest DB pension risk transfer (PRT) markets are in the UK and the US (Figures 6 
and 7). In both cases, recent growth surges have been driven by the introduction of stricter pension 
disclosure standards, and stricter regulations that mandated risk-based guarantee schemes (2004 
UK Pensions Act and 2006 US Pension Protection Act). Canada has also seen a steady and growing 
flow of buy-out transactions, and a large longevity swap (Figure 8).  
Figures 6, 7, and 8 here 
PRT markets are supported by longevity risk transfer (LRT) markets in which (re)insurers 
transfer annuity-related risks to other (re)insurers. For example, Canada’s Sun Life backed a C$5 
billion longevity swap with Bell Canada Pension Plan with longevity reinsurance from a couple 
of Canadian branches/subsidiaries of foreign reinsurers. The size of the LRT market is difficult to 
track because it is more opaque than PRT markets, but since 2012 about half of all PRT 
transactions were probably backed by LRT trades. Many of these transactions cross borders, and 
fluid cross-border reinsurance markets are important to the functioning of any primary insurance 
markets (Swiss Re 2016). For example, since 2015, Dutch life insurer Aegon has hedged the 
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longevity risk associated with €18 billion of annuities with Canada Life Reinsurance (Aegon 
2019). 
Some cross-border LRT transactions may be motivated by regulatory arbitrage. For 
example, Solvency 2 insurance regulations may be incentivizing European (re)insurers to look to 
hedge their longevity risks with (re)insurers from foreign jurisdictions having less stringent 
longevity risk capital charges and reserving requirements. 
Cross-Border Reinsurance Frictions. Some jurisdictions have imposed regulatory frictions on 
cross-border reinsurance. These can take the form of onerous or vague foreign (re)insurer 
registration requirements, or heavy collateralization requirements. For example, for Canadian 
(re)insurers to get capital credit from reinsurance from ‘unregistered’ (re)insurers, the 
reinsurance must be over-collateralized with Canadian dollar assets held in Canada (OSFI 2010). 
The US rules previously worked in a similar way, but since 2011, US (re)insurers can get capital 
relief from offshore-sourced reinsurance, without full collateralization if the reinsurer is rated at 
least BBB and from a qualified jurisdiction as determined by the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).1  
For European (re)insurers to get capital credit from offshore-sourced reinsurance, 
collateralization of covered liabilities and associated capital requirements may not be required if 
the reinsurer is rated at least BBB or from a jurisdiction deemed equivalent for reinsurance 
supervision.2 Yet according to market sources, aside from the UK, country-specific 
implementation of the rules has been spotty (Pruitt et al. 2019). This should improve as the EU-
US Covered Agreement is phased in, eliminating collateral and local presence requirements for 
qualified US reinsurers operating in the EU and UK insurance markets, and vice versa.3 
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Capital Market Transactions. A relatively untapped pool of potential longevity risk takers may 
consist of asset managers, sovereign wealth funds, private equity funds, and hedge funds. Asset 
managers and sovereign wealth funds may be encouraged by the fact that longevity risk is likely 
to be largely uncorrelated to the other risk factors in their portfolios.4 However, hedge funds may 
be put off by the long duration of the contracts (and the potential need to make collateral 
arrangements over this time frame), which may make them inappropriate for most hedge funds’ 
investment styles. 
Buyers of longevity risk may be discouraged by the illiquidity of instruments. Sellers of 
longevity risk would tend to seek customized hedge contracts to maximize effectiveness of risk 
transfer, yet many buyers of this risk would likely prefer standardized investments to maximize 
liquidity. This fundamental difference in perspective complicates the development of an active 
market. More standardized products would improve liquidity for risk buyers, but would also 
increase basis risk for risk sellers, since standardization will likely increase the demographic 
differences between the actual pool of retirees and the reference pool on which payments are based.  
In addition, buyers face the problem of asymmetric information. Given that a pension fund 
may have a better idea of how healthy its population of retirees is likely to be, the resulting 
asymmetric information may create a selection bias whereby only those pension funds with the 
longest-living populations would want to hedge the risk. The existence of such asymmetric 
information can lead to a breakdown of the market (see Mitchell and McCarthy 2002). Pricing 
contracts with asymmetric information is difficult, and so mispricing often occurs in the early 
stages of most markets when such asymmetries are most acute. Index-based transactions may 
lessen the problem of asymmetric information but will increase basis risk. 
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Both buyers and sellers of longevity risk face counterparty risk. Counterparty risk arises 
because longevity risk transfer deals tend to be long-term contracts where the counterparty may 
not (be able to) honor its financial commitments over time. It is usually dealt with by 
collateralization, which can involve significant costs because it requires that the proceeds be 
invested in high-quality liquid securities that may be in short supply. This consideration favors 
longevity swaps, which require collateralizing only the difference between what each swap 
participant owes the other.5 
Several unsuccessful attempts have been made to launch longevity bonds.6 The payout on 
a longevity bond depends on the longevity experience of a given population, so the payment is 
related to the number of survivors in the population (Figure 9). In essence, it pays out a declining 
series of coupons as the proportion of survivors in the reference population declines (Blake and 
Burrows 2001). One disadvantage is that, unlike with a swap, the bond buyer makes a large upfront 
payment to the issuer, resulting in a counterparty risk exposure to the issuer. Such counterparty 
risk would be mitigated if the bonds were issued by a high-quality sovereign or supranational,7 or 
by a special purpose vehicle that invested the proceeds in low-risk highly liquid fixed income 
securities, from which the income covers the bond payouts. The issuer might also transfer some or 
all the longevity risk to a reinsurer, probably via a longevity swap contract. 
Figure 9 here 
Swaps may be more likely to activate broader capital market interest. For example, the 
2012 €12 billion longevity swap between Dutch insurer Aegon and Deutsche Bank used standard 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) documentation and was targeted 
specifically at institutional investors (Whittaker 2012). It had a 20-year maturity with a close-out 
mechanism that determined the final payment, as opposed to the open-ended maturities of more 
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traditional transactions. In addition, the longevity-indexed floating payments are floored and 
capped so that investors are not exposed to open-ended risk if longevity is either under- or 
overestimated. Finally, it used a longevity index based on publicly available data to drive cash 
flows, as opposed to the actual longevity experience of Aegon’s annuity book.8 Aegon followed 
up with a similar transaction in 2013, a €1.4 billion deal structured and syndicated by Société 
Générale (Osborn 2013). Nevertheless, there have apparently been no similar transactions since 
then. 
Finally, both sides of the market are also affected by a lack of reliable and sufficiently 
granular information about longevity developments. Life tables are updated infrequently and are 
only available for relatively aggregated groups in the population. Several unsuccessful projects 
have attempted to solve this problem. In 2005, Credit Suisse introduced a US longevity index 
based on publicly available US government mortality tables but quietly pulled it sometime later 
(Credit Suisse 2005). In 2007, Goldman Sachs introduced a mortality/longevity index (QxX) on 
the US insured population over the age of 65, aimed primarily at the life settlements market,9 but 
it was shut down in late 2009 (Goldman Sachs 2007). In 2007, J.P. Morgan launched the 
LifeMetrics index of historical and current statistics on mortality rates and life expectancy, across 
genders, ages and nationalities (J.P. Morgan 2007). In 2010, J.P. Morgan transferred this operation 
over to the Life & Longevity Markets Association (LLMA) founded in 2010 to produce 
standardized index-based longevity swap curves and pricing models, but the LLMA closed down 
a few years later.10 In 2007, Deutsche Bourse launched exchange-traded longevity swaps based on 
their XPect family of longevity indices supported by data from Club Vita, but these have also since 
closed (Sachsenweger and Rogge 2011). Nevertheless, Club Vita, founded in 2008, lives on and 
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is producing Canadian, UK, and US VitaCurves. Because these are not publicly available, they 
have been of little use for pricing capital markets transactions. 
Before examining more recent proposals for structuring longevity risk transfer 
transactions, the next section looks at catastrophe risk transfer markets, from which useful lessons 
for longevity risk transfer can be gleaned. 
 
Catastrophe (CAT) Risk Transfer Markets 
(Re)insurers are using catastrophe risk transfer markets to finance their coverage of low-
probability high-severity event risk in return for a pre-specified return.11 These markets help 
(re)insurers diversify their sources of risk capital through highly-collateralized transactions, while 
providing attractive yield to sophisticated investors (such as special purpose funds, hedge funds, 
pension funds, and family offices). Most market-based CAT risk protection is fully collateralized 
against peak exposures, and it is paid out more quickly than reinsurance liabilities (rarely 
redeemable on demand and where claims payments can be spread over many years). Most 
institutional investors active in this asset class probably do so via specialist funds, of which there 
more than 50 managing over $100 billion of investments (Evans 2020e). 
Nonetheless, the market remains small relative to traditional reinsurance (Figure 10). At 
end-June 2019, outstanding CAT risk transfer instruments totaled $93 billion (about 15 percent of 
total global reinsurance capital) comprised of collateralized reinsurance ($49 billion), CAT bonds 
($30 billion), and limited purpose reinsurance vehicles such as sidecars and industry loss 
warranties ($14 billion) (Aon 2019a, 2019b; Figure 11). Some of the growth may be related to 
Europe’s Solvency II insurance regulation, which went into effect in 2016 and redefined how 
(re)insurers can use these instruments to hedge natural CAT risk (Braun and Weber 2017). 
9 
 
Figures 10 and 11 here 
CAT bonds are like regular bonds, in that in exchange for an up-front investment, they pay 
interest until they are redeemed (Figures 12 and 13).12 Embedded in these bonds is a call option 
that puts the principal payment of investors fully at risk. On the occurrence of a loss event, 
proceeds are released from the transaction to help the (re)insurer pay all claims arising from the 
event (i.e., ‘creating insurance recoverable’); investors could lose their entire principal if the 
contingent event is sufficiently large. In return for the option, investors receive a premium to the 
investor based on the likelihood of such a loss event. If no loss event occurs during the term of the 
bond, the collateral is returned to investors based on a release schedule that defines the time frame 
and threshold that must be met in order for the collateral release. If there is uncertainty as to 
whether there has been an event, part or all of the collateral can be ‘trapped’ until all facts have 
been clarified, and losses, if any, have been confirmed. For example, COVID-19 has introduced 
legal uncertainties around property (re)insurance coverage-related business interruption claims 
that could lead to collateral trapping in 2020 and beyond (Evans 2020c). All collateralized CAT 
risk transfer instruments are subject to trapped collateral risk. 
Figures 12 and 13 here 
Collateralized reinsurance is a contractual commitment in which a reinsurer assumes a 
portion of an insurer’s risk in exchange for an agreed amount of premium (Figure 14). It can be 
structured on an excess-of-loss basis, by which losses are triggered if they exceed a predefined 
threshold, or on a proportional basis by which the reinsurer takes a pro-rata share of premiums and 
losses associated with a specific book of business. Collateralized reinsurance is much cheaper and 
more streamlined to structure than a CAT bond. A CAT bond issuer must pay for credit ratings, 
distribution costs, and legal costs; moreover, US SEC Rule 144A compliance requires extensive 
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documentation and disclosure. Also, CAT bonds issued under Rule 144A can take an average of 
10 weeks to close, versus four weeks for a collateralized reinsurance deal. The latter may also 
dispense with the third-party risk assessment required for CAT bonds (Woodall 2013). 
Figure 14 here 
Sidecars are a limited-life special purpose vehicle funded by capital market participants 
and sponsored by a reinsurer from which it derives its business or quota share. The sidecar assumes 
a percentage of the ceding reinsurer's underwriting risk in exchange for a similar percentage of the 
associated premiums (Figure 15). The sidecar's capital is typically funded via equity and debt 
issuance, the proceeds of which, along with premiums and investment income, are transferred to a 
collateral trust that fully collateralizes the underwritten risk. Because risk is shared via a quota 
share arrangement, information asymmetries between counterparties with regard to the sponsor’s 
underwriting portfolio are reduced (Cummins and Barrieu 2013). Unlike other CAT risk transfer 
product, sidecars are often not restricted to only covering losses from specifically named perils, so 
their performance tends to track the loss experiences of the re/insurer and can often include a 
broader range of perils. Hence, sidecars could be more vulnerable, for example, to COVID-19 
related claims burdens (Evans 2020d). 
Figure 15 here 
Industry loss warranties (ILWs) are dual-trigger reinsurance contracts that pay off when a 
specified industry wide loss index exceeds a threshold and the issuing insurer’s losses from the 
event equal or exceed a specified amount (Figure 16). The second trigger is usually quite low 
compared to the main trigger. The term is typically one year. ILWs may have binary triggers, 
where the full amount of the contract pays off once the two triggers are satisfied, or pro rata triggers 
where the payoff depends upon how much the loss exceeds the warranty. Because the second 
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trigger and the contingent payout is indemnity-based, ILWs are treated as reinsurance for 
regulatory purposes. 
Figure 16 here 
CAT products with indemnity triggers based on actual losses provide perfect coverage, 
which makes them a close substitute for a reinsurance contract. Yet loss recovery periods are 
longer, and investors cite potential moral hazards inherent in these structures. In this context, moral 
hazard refers to the risk that the reinsured counterparty relaxes underwriting standards, including 
ongoing monitoring (where relevant), and/or may settle claims less stringently. Instead, investors 
tend to prefer index-based, modeled and parametric indices. Parametric and index-based 
instruments determine the contingent payments on objective data that are correlated with issuer or 
insured party potential losses. Index-based contingent payments are based on generic industry-
wide and/or geographic indices of insured losses correlated with the issuer’s or insured party’s 
potential losses.13 Parametric instruments use scientific and statistical data related to the cause and 
magnitude of a catastrophe, such as wind speeds for hurricane-linked instruments. Index-linked 
instruments are simpler to structure and execute than parametric instruments, but they expose 
reinsured parties to the basis risk that the coverage may not exactly match actual losses.  
The securitization of ‘peak mortality’ risks, primarily related to pandemic-type events, 
relies on parametric triggers. For example, the contingent payouts on the $521 million Swiss Re 
Vita III principal at risk notes issued in 2007 were based on indices of general population mortality 
rates in the covered countries. Losses to each of the note's nine tranches are triggered when the 
index exceeds their corresponding attachment point and reach 100 percent when the index reaches 
the exhaustion point (Moody’s 2007).  
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Mortality bonds were last issued in 2017 when the World Bank issued $320 million of 
three-year pandemic bonds. Two classes of bonds were issued, $225 million of Class A bonds that 
cover flu and coronavirus, and $95 million of Class B bonds that cover filovirus, coronavirus, lassa 
fever, rift valley fever and Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever. The bonds provided parametric 
protection linked to the occurrence of specific pandemics, the trigger for both bonds being based 
on World Health Organization reported deaths and cases that hit the covered areas, which for some 
perils is global, others a subset of countries. In April 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic triggered 
payouts of $37.5 million on the Class A bonds and $95.0 million on the Class B bonds (Gross 
2020). 
Since 2010, Aetna has been issuing morbidity bonds that transfer risk of extreme claims 
for medical costs (Figure 17). For example, Aetna issued its 11th series of Vitality Re morbidity 
bonds in January 2020, a $200 million two-tranche deal, with $140 million of Class A and $60 
million of Class B notes (Figure 18). For each annual risk period, the payout trigger is based on an 
index of Aetna’s medical benefit claims ratio, the annual incurred benefits divided by the annual 
total premiums. If the index rises above a predefined attachment point level for either of the 
tranches, it will trigger a payment. The Class A notes cover Aetna for losses above an index of 102 
percent (equivalent to a $1.02 billion loss level on the covered premia), and the Class B notes cover 
losses above 96 percent ($960 million). None of the Vitality Re ILS transactions have ever paid 
out for Aetna, even though the COVID-19 pandemic drove significant numbers to hospitals in the 
US and elevated health insurance claims levels (Evans 2020b). 




What Hope for Vibrant Longevity Risk Transfer Markets? 
If one were to look to CAT risk transfer markets for guidance on how to ignite capital 
markets interest in longevity risk, the keys would seem to be short terms to maturity and full 
collateralization to minimize credit risk (Table 1). The theoretical literature seems to provide little 
guidance on other potential factors. Some models suggest that capital markets-based insurance risk 
transfer is more viable for insurance risk portfolios in which potential losses are large and/or highly 
correlated, making retaining them expensive for (re)insurers to maintain prudent capital levels 
(Cummins and Trainar 2009). Yet most of the recent increase in CAT instrument issuance is due 
to collateralized reinsurance that protects smaller losses. Hence, large losses are still primarily 
either retained or transferred through traditional reinsurance (Subramanian and Wang 2018). 
Table 1 here 
Hagendorff et al. (2014) found that access to insurance risk transfer markets should be 
easiest for (re)insurers with less risky portfolios. Investors will shy away from riskier portfolios 
because they do not have access to the private information that reinsurers have, so they must use 
publicly available information to assess portfolio risk. These investors will likely demand higher 
yields, making capital markets-based solutions less attractive than capital market-based solutions 
to such insurers. Yet Subramanian and Wang (2018) used a signaling model to show that 
(re)insurers riskier portfolios will be more likely to issue CAT bonds. 
Product design could overcome information asymmetry problems. For example, according 
to Finken and Laux (2009), CAT risk transfer products with parametric or index triggers are 
insensitive to information asymmetry and may be attractive to low-risk insurers who suffer from 
adverse selection with reinsurance. Products with indemnity triggers may be unattractive to capital 
markets investors because they fear that low-risk insurers will opt for reinsurance, and only high-
14 
 
risk insurers will opt to tap capital markets. Low-risk insurers will only issue parametric- or index-
triggered risk-transfer products if the reinsurance premium exceeds the expected costs from the 
resulting basis risk. 
As noted above, a few longevity risk transfer transactions in the past did tap capital 
markets, but there has been no follow-up. A big challenge is resolving the tension between the 
long-term nature of longevity risk and investor preference for a short-term investment horizon 
(Blake et al. 2019). Cedents may also prefer shorter horizons due to the risk of the loss of capital 
relief if regulations change. Other challenges include finding, funding, and safekeeping prudent 
collateral. Bugler et al. (2020) proposed a sidecar structure for longevity risk transfer (Figures 19). 
Langhorne Re was set up by Reinsurance Group of America (RGA) in 2018 to carry out such 
transactions, but it has yet to do one (Evans 2020a). 
Figure 19 here 
Transferring risks in the financial markets depends on the ability to identify, measure, and 
isolate specific risk characteristics. In this regard, longevity risk transfer markets may be held back 
by a lack of reliable and sufficiently granular information about longevity developments. Better 
longevity risk management and transfer would benefit from much more granular demographic data 
(including, for example, by postal code and cause of death), which can reduce basis risk and could 
generate indexes that would facilitate the design and trading of longevity risk transfer instruments. 
Index-based transactions may also lessen the problem of asymmetric information. 
A better marketplace would also be well served by a common agreement between market 
participants on which mortality models to use for the design and pricing of each longevity-linked 
deal. A main reason why Aegon’s deal with Société Générale went ahead in 2013 was that all 
parties agreed to use the same mortality model. Even if a particular model produced the wrong 
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forecasts (which it is bound to do), if those forecasts were not systematically biased, then it 
becomes a potential candidate for use in this market. The Black and Scholes (1976) option pricing 
model and its variants are examples of such models operating in traditional financial markets. 
Ideally, such models are reasonably parsimonious and amenable to closed-form solutions, from 
which underlying parameters can be bootstrapped from market data. 
We also recognize that there may a tension between investors’ preference for index-based 
risk transfer, and cedents’ for indemnity transactions. Yet Michaelson and Mulholland (2014) 
claim that hedge programs can be designed using customized population-wide index-based 
mortality data that minimize basis risk between the hedger’s portfolio and the population 
referenced index. First, it involves customizing three elements of the hedge exposure; the cohorts 
(combinations of age and gender), relative cohort weighting over time (‘exposure vector’), and 
‘experience ratio matrix’ based on an experience study of the hedger's portfolio. Second, it 
involves designing an out-of-the-money spread option product structure with attachment and 
exhaustion points set to minimize the cost of capital for the cedent’s capital relief taking into 
account market dynamics and investor preferences (see also Cairns and El Boukfaoui 2019). 
MacMinn and Zhu (2018) have addressed the topic of optimal design at a broader level, 
showing that value-based hedging instruments dominate a full cash-flow hedging ones by 
generating a higher stock value to the company’s shareholders. Cash-flow hedges consist of a 
series of payments that offset or stabilize the liability cash-flow of cedent, such as buy-ins and 
buy-outs. Value-based hedges consists of one cash payoff contingent on a publicly observable 
longevity/mortality event. The key difference between the two is that, while the value-based hedge 
only benchmarks its payments based on the underlying systematic shocks, the cash-flow hedge 
also hedges unexplainable shifts in future mortality. 
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Nevertheless, MacMinn and Brockett (2017) note that hedging can make annuity portfolios 
more valuable and makes annuity holders better off, as it reduces the value of shareholders’ 
effective put option on the cedent. So even if a hedge frees up reserves to invest in a positive NPV 
projects, it would only be worthwhile if project NPVs exceeds the firm’s put value. The authors 
claimed that the failure of capital markets-based longevity risk transfer could be as simple as this. 
Furthermore, Zelenko (2014) has blamed the failure of the Chilean longevity bond on another 
moral hazard problem: the perceived likelihood that the government would bail out (re)insurers 
and/or annuitants hit by systematic longevity risk events. 
 
Conclusion 
Today, longevity risk transfer markets’ ‘buy side’ remains largely comprised of 
(re)insurers, and there have been only sporadic efforts to tap capital markets. Although CAT risk 
transfer activity is also dominated by traditional reinsurance, there is active participation by 
institutional investors in alternative risk capital markets. The CAT risk transfer market analysis 
and academic literature summarized above suggests what some of the impediments and solutions 
may be. 
A major constraint to new product is a dearth of granular longevity and demographic data. 
Governments are best placed to provide such data, perhaps through national statistical offices or 
government actuaries. Most important would be longevity information disaggregated by 
geographic area, gender, socio-economic status, cause of death, and occupation. Governments 
could also usefully track the emergence and evolution of new diseases, especially those afflicting 
the elderly, medical advances, and life-style changes. 
Ideally, longevity risk transfer products would be based on common and publicly available 
data. In that regard, it is a shame that all the efforts at building such databases and making them 
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public have failed (e.g., LifeMetrics and XPect). Of course, there may a tension with cedents’ 
preference for indemnity transactions to minimize basis risk, but there are some promising ways 
to bridge this gap (Michaelson and Mulholland 2014; Cairns and El Boukfaoui 2019). For instance, 
Blake et al. (2010) have advocated government-issued longevity bonds that would provide 
benchmarks and liquidity to the market, in the same way that government-issued inflation-linked 
bonds helped capital markets thrive. Although governments are already heavily exposed to 
longevity risk, they argue that there would be no increase in aggregate longevity risk if such 
issuance were coupled with the indexation of retirement ages to longevity increases. In practice, 
however, such indexation has proven to be politically very difficult. 
There also needs to be agreement between market participants on mortality models, ideally 
ones that are reasonably parsimonious and amenable to closed-form solutions from which 
underlying parameters can be bootstrapped from market data. Standardized data and models could 
also open the door to investors who prefer shorter terms to maturity. Taking a cue from CAT risk 
transfer markets, the sweet spot could be three to five years, since as MacMinn and Zhu (2018) 
showed, value-based products with shorter terms could be more attractive to cedents than cash-
flow based risk transfer. Biffis and Blake (2014) have also proposed that an optimal format would 
entail a tranched principal-at-risk instrument very much like a CAT bond.  
Of course, it may be that activating investor interest in longevity risk transfer markets is an 
intractable problem, as suggested by MacMinn and Brockett (2017): what is good for annuitants 
may not be best for cedents, on account of the loss of the balance sheet put option. Moreover, 
markets may be held back by the moral hazard problem related to the perceived likelihood that the 
government would bail out (re)insurers and/or annuitants hit by systematic longevity risk events 
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1 Although the new rules were introduced in 2011, it was not until January 1, 2019 that all US 
states adopted them. Under them, the collateralization requirement is 10 percent for AA-rated 
reinsurers, 20 percent for those rated A+ and A, 50 percent at A-, and 75 percent at BBB 
(NYDFS 2020). Bermuda, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, and the UK are NAIC-
qualified jurisdictions (NAIC 2019).  
2 The European Commission has granted Australia, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Japan, Mexico, 
Switzerland, and the US equivalence for reinsurance, excepting Bermudan captives and special 
purpose insurers (EIOPA 2020).  
3 The EU-US Covered Agreement (and the parallel US-UK Covered Agreement) entered into 
force on April 4, 2018, but the reinsurance collateral reduction elements are not required to be 
fully implemented until September 22, 2022. 
4 The value of longevity risk transfer instruments are correlated with interest rate levels via their 
role in the present value discounting of future payouts, so the lack-of-correlation rationale may 
be less than expected. 
5 Biffis et al. (2016) show that longevity swap collateral costs can be quite reasonable, especially 
when counterparty default risk and collateral rules are symmetric. 
6 There was the Swiss Re-issued 2010 Kortis Bond, which was touted as a longevity bond, but 
was actually more of a longevity basis bond. The bond’s payout was based on the divergence in 
mortality rates between the UK and the US, where Swiss Re reinsured pensions and annuities in 
both countries (Hunt and Blake 2015). It was touted to be the ‘next big thing’, but there have 
been no such offerings since. 
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7 The AAA-rated European Investment Bank tried to issue a longevity bond in 2004, but it was 
cancelled due to lack of interest on both the buy- and sell-side (Biffis and Blake 2009). The 
AAA-rated World Bank tried a similar product in 2010, but it also failed (Zelenko 2014). 
8 The Aegon-Deutsche Bank transaction references Dutch population mortality data published by 
the Dutch National Office for Statistics. See Sagoo and Douglas (2012) for more detail.  
9 A life settlement occurs when the owner of a life insurance policy sells the policy for an 
amount below the face value of the policy. The purchaser becomes responsible for making 
premium payments in return for collecting death benefits. 
10 The LLMA was a non-profit group made up of several investment banks, insurers, and 
reinsurers interested in facilitating the structuring of longevity risk transfer deals (Evans 2011). 
11 Reinsurers provide insurance for insurers and reinsurance for reinsurers (‘retrocession’). 
Reinsurance gives (re)insurers capital relief and expanded underwriting capacity and 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage (IAIS 2012). 
12 The proceeds from these bonds fully collateralize the transfer of insurance exposures (up to the 
aggregate contractual policy limit) from or more ceding (re)insurance companies. 
13 A frequently used set of indices for US-based perils is that compiled by Property Claims 





Figure 1. Cumulative pension risk transfer totals by country and product 






























Figure 2. Assets held in defined benefit pension funds 
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Figure 3. Structure of pension buy-out and buy-in transactions 
Source: Joint Forum (2013). 
 
Figure 4. Structure of longevity swap transactions 
Source: Joint Forum (2013). 
 
Figure 5. Structure of longevity transfers by defined-benefit pension plans, by type of 
counterparty 
Source: Joint Forum (2013). 
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Figure 6. UK pension risk transfer transactions 






































Figure 7. US pension buy-out and buy-in transactions 




































Figure 8. Canadian pension risk transfer transactions 



































Figure 9. Structure of longevity bond transaction 














Periodic  payments based on 







Figure 10. Global reinsurance capital 



































Figure 11. Alternative global reinsurance outstanding 


































Figure 12. Structure of a CAT bond transaction 





















Figure 13. CAT bond and insurance-linked securities issuance 














































































Figure 17. Extreme mortality/morbidity bond issuance 
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Table 1: Summary of active capital markets-accessible CAT risk transfer vehicles 
  Collateralized Industry Loss  
 CAT Bonds Reinsurance Warranties Sidecars 
Credit risk Minimala Minimal Dependsb Dependsc 
Basis risk Dependsd Minimal Yes Minimal 
Moral hazard Yes Yes No Moderate 
Transparency High Low High High 
Typical term 3-5 years 1 year 1 year 1 year 
Standardization Moderate Low Moderate Low 
Liquidity Moderate Low Low Low 
Outstanding (2019) $30 billion $49 billion $14 billion 
Notes: 
a CAT bond credit risk is usually minimal but depends on investment restrictions, 
swap counterparty arrangements, topping up rules, etc. 
b Industry loss warranty credit risk depends on if the limit is collateralized 
c Sidecar credit risk depends on structure and collateral arrangements 
d CAT bond basis risk depends on whether it is indemnity-based (no basis risk) or 
not. 
Source: Cummins and Weiss (2009), and author’s assessments based on market 
surveillance and particularly the Artemis.bm website. 
 
